In this paper, we examine whether the determinants and forms of executive compensation for NYSE versus NASDAQ listed firms are the same during the period from 1992 to 2004. We also investigate whether the determinants and forms of executive compensation changed after the NASDAQ crash in 2000 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. Our results reveal that the factors that explain executive compensation for NYSE and NASDAQ listed firms are generally different. We also find that executives are paid different forms of compensation for NYSE and NASDAQ listed firms and that the forms of compensation change after the NASDAQ crash but essentially after the Sarbanes-Oxley act in 2002.
I. Introduction
Beginning late 80s and early 90s, the world has witnessed the demise of centrally controlled socialist economies and rise of free market capitalist system. Privatization of state controlled enterprises, removal of barriers of international trade, free flow of information, capital and labor, and advances of technology have indeed created a small global integrated global village producing an unparallel global economic growth. As a consequence of growth of global economy, we have also witnessed a significant increase in the market value of companies all over the world. Global growth, market integration, new opportunities, and increased corporate profitability have intensified the search and competition for executive talent across the world. Firms now compete for highly qualified executives globally hoping that their knowledge would be instrumental in increasing the share value of the firms that they would manage.
In this changing global economic and corporate environment firms, particularly new economy firms, started paying their executives based on performances, essentially with stock options. With stock options at their disposal, executives found an added motivation to increase the value of the stock to raise their chances of exercising their options later and hence increasing their wealth.
However, in the year 2000, the NASDAQ crash slowed this economic growth and also some financial scandals came to the forefront, along with the bankruptcy of companies such as Enron and WorldCom, resulting from fraudulent accounting practices and executive self-dealings. Management, in some widely publicized cases, distorted the accounting data to manipulate the stock price in order to enhance personal compensation by exercising options. In order to solve the problems associated with these scandals, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was created in the USA. It introduced sweeping changes in governance, reporting, and disclosure requirements of public firms with the intent of improving accuracy, reliability and timeliness of the information provided to investors.
Interest in research in executive compensation is recent but growing. In this paper, we extend the executive compensation research to the NYSE versus NASDAQ listed firms. We focus our attention on the following questions: Are the total values and the factors that explain executive compensation for the NYSE versus NASDAQ listed firms the same? Is the compensation composition given to these executives Our results reveal that executives from NYSE receive, on average, more than the other executives and the differences in total compensation values are statistically significant. We also find that the forms of compensation for NYSE versus NASDAQ listed firms are different. In other words, the percentage that each compensation component represents in total compensation is different in these sub-samples and this structure changes in all the cases, essentially after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Our results also reveal that the factors that explain CEO and Directors" compensation on the NYSE and NASDAQ are generally different, and when some factors are the same, the coefficients are statistically different.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II describes the literature review and research questions. Section III discusses the data, sample selection and statistics. Section IV presents research design, section V the empirical results and section VI the conclusions.
II. Literature review and research questions
The literature review reveals there is only one study similar and related to our topic. Firth, Lohen, Ropstad and Sjo (1996) focusing on Norwegian Stock Exchange listed firms explore the determinants of Chief Executive Officers (CEO) compensation. They find a modest positive relationship between CEO compensation and the average wage level of the company and a strong positive relationship between CEO compensation and firm size.
Not directly related to the problem of executive compensation and listed firms, but as a parallel investigation, there are a small number of recent studies associated with firms listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX that may bear important implications for the findings and conclusions of our study. For example, Sapp and Yan (2000) find that some of the small firms listed on NASDAQ are changing to AMEX because the transaction costs are smaller at AMEX (NASDAQ as a competitive multidealer system and AMEX like NYSE a monopoly specialist system) and when they change generally their liquidity improves.
Also Chung, Ness and Ness (1999, 2001 ) and Bacidore and Lipson (2001) , find evidence that transaction costs on NASDAQ are higher than on the NYSE and due to this, some NASDAQ firms are also changing to the NYSE to reduce costs. Lipson (2001) investigates the effect of opening and closing procedures on the NYSE and NASDAQ by examining firms that moved from the NASDAQ to the NYSE and find evidence that opening trades on the NYSE are about 20 percent less costly than NASDAQ and these savings on the NYSE opening increase with the size of the firms. If NASDAQ and NYSE have different transaction cost structures and the firms that are listed there have different characteristics we expect that the factors that explain executive compensation would also be different. NASDAQ listed firms are essentially technological firms with low levels of cash flows (Murphy, 2003) and also NASDAQ transaction costs are generally higher than those of the NYSE. These fundamental differences can also affect what the company can pay to its executives. Another point that we analyze is associated with the impact of the NASDAQ crash (2000) and the enactment of Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) on executive compensation. So far, we know that the NASDAQ crash caused a reduction in compensation values, but what happened to the components of compensation packages? Do they still have the same proportion of salary, bonus, stock options, restricted stocks or LTIP2 in terms of total compensation as before the NASDAQ crash? And also was there a significant change in forms and weights of compensation after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002?
Effectively, after the NASDAQ crash, there were a series of financial scandals associated with the bankruptcy of some of large American companies, based on fraudulent accounting practices and executives` self-dealing. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was established precisely on July 30 th to solve this problem. It introduced sweeping changes in governance, reporting, and disclosure requirements of public firms with the intent of improving accuracy, reliability, and timeliness of the information provided to investors. This Act contains provisions which have a significant impact on the benefits and compensation of public company executives. The major changes in this area include the following provisions: to prohibit publicly-traded companies from making or arranging loans for their directors and executive officers; to expedite Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reporting to insider traders; to prohibit corporate directors and executive officers from trading employers` securities during planned blackout periods with respect to those securities and to require an employee retirement Income Security Act to cover individual account plans to provide a 30-day notice of blackout periods. After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, each of the major US stock markets, the NYSE, the NASDAQ, and the AMEX adopted new listing standards in an effort to strengthen the corporate governance practices of listed companies, associated with director independence, audit committees, compensation committees, nominating committees, stock option plans, certification, directors/officers and disclosure and foreign issuers. If a group of new rules of corporate governance were adopted by the NYSE and NASDAQ we expect that the way in which companies pay their executives will change after these important changes.
III. Data, sample selection and statistics

A. Data and sample selection
Data is from the Execucomp database, which collects information about the five highest-paid executives 2 Generally, executive compensation is composed of two more components: "other annual compensation" and "all other compensations". The first case includes the types of compensation not included in salary and bonus and in the second case, all other forms of compensation not included in the other categories. We don"t analyze these two forms of compensation because they are residual components and also because they include a large diversity of compensation products. from 1500 firms listed on the S&P 500 Index, S&P Mid Cap Index, and S&P Small Cap Index.
We use Unbalanced Panel Data Analysis. The sample consists of 73,683 observations of compensation, related to the 5 highest-paid executives from S&P 1500 firms between the years 1992 and 2004. This sample is built excluding all executives whose sum of salary and bonus, and also total compensation, was equal to zero. We include only longer period compensation (and delete the shorter period compensation) of executives who receive more than one compensation in the same year. There are a few instances where an executive switched the job and received two different compensations in the same year. Using the Consumer Price Index (CPI), compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, with 1982 as base of 100, we adjust the monetary variables to the price level of the year 2004. To select between NYSE, NASDAQ firms we use the variable EXCHANGE from Execucomp, which classifies NYS as NYSE firms, NAS as NASDAQ listed firms. Based on Chen and Hung (2006) we make the differentiation between CEO and Directors" compensations because, generally, the average compensation value of CEOs is higher than that of Directors, and also the factors that explain their compensation can also be different.
B. Statistics
In this section we examine the question weather the executives from firms listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ are paid differently in terms of total value and the compensation components and weather these items (total compensation value and components) change after the NASDAQ crash in 2000 and after the introduction of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SO) table 1 we can see that the average compensation of five highest paid NYSE executives is far higher than the average total compensation of five highest paid NASDAQ executives, and these differences are statistically significant. Both CEOs and directors of the NYSE listed firms receive, on average, much more than the CEOs and directors of NASDAQ listed firms. Mean differences in compensation values are generally significant. Table 2 presents the average total compensation  of executives of NYSE, and NASDAQ listed firms,  and the Independent-Samples T-test to compare the  means of executive compensation components and  Levene's test for equality of variances between the  two sub-samples of NYSE and NASDAQ listed firms, each year for the period of 1992 to 2004. Yearly analysis gives us a better comparison because single average value based on thirteen yearly observations could be influenced by outlier years. The null hypothesis will be that all population means are equal; the alternative hypothesis is that at least one of the means is different. We also see that, in the case of the NYSE and NASDAQ, the importance of restricted stocks in total compensation increases in the later years.
Results for panel B show that for NYSE listed firms, salary is the most important compensation component between 1992 and 1995 and after that, stock options are the most important component of CEO compensation. Essentially in the later years, bonus also becomes an important component of CEO compensation.
In the case of NASDAQ listed firms, the most important compensation component is also salary but after 1996 stock options have practically achieved similar level of importance.
If we analyze the impact of the NASDAQ crash on CEO compensation, comparing the change in percentage that each compensation component represents in terms of total compensation between the year 2000 and 2001, we see that NYSE executives receive more stock options and less bonus, and NASDAQ executives receive more stock options, more salary and less bonus.
In terms of the impact of Sarbanes Oxley Act, comparing results for 2002 and 2003, we see that NYSE executives receive fewer stock options and more bonus and restricted stocks. NASDAQ executives also receive fewer stock options and more bonus, salary and essentially restricted stocks.
If we compare the compensation components between CEOs and Directors, we see that directors receive more salary than CEOs. NASDAQ listed firms reveal that bonus is a more important component of compensation for directors than for CEOs but in the case of the NYSE this difference is small. In all the cases CEOs receive more stock options than Directors. The use of restricted stock becomes an important component after the Sarbanes Oxley Act in 2002 for NYSE and NASDAQ listed firms.
IV. Research Design
We first examine the determinants of executive compensation. We believe that that if firms listed on the NYSE are significantly different from firms listed on NASDAQ, the factors that explain the executive compensation in these two groups may also be different. In this section we make this analysis.
We 
can assume the values of LN(total compensation), LN(Option ratio) or LN( Cash compensation) and f is the fixed effect.
A. Independent Variables
To explain the factors that affect the executive compensation of the NYSE and the NASDAQ listed firms we use a group of financial and governance variables.
A.1-Financial Variables
Firm size has been reported as one of the most important variables to explain executive compensation. To measure the impact of firm size on executive compensation, researchers generally use the variables Assets, Market Value or firm Sales with our without natural logarithm. But which of these variables is best to measure the impact of firm size on executive compensation? There is no empirical answer to this question. Researchers use only one of these variables, at the expense of other variables, to capture the size effect which they believe will produce the results most consistent with their research design. Each of the size variables has an impact on executive compensation but these variables are highly correlated, and cannot be introduced at the same time to explain executive compensation in the regression model, we therefore introduce a new technique by using the Principal Component Analysis to extract a factor that contains information from the three variables and resolve this old problem in executive compensation research.
The factor that measures firm size will be composed of the following variables: We expect that firm size component will have a positive relationship with all three executive compensation dependent variables. Authors like Noguera and Highfield (2007) also report that because larger firms have more complex operations and will be more difficult to monitor therefore the use of incentives based compensation is practiced more in large firms than in small firms. We thus expect a stronger relationship between dependent variable and firm size in the case of NYSE listed firms which are essentially large firms.
We also use the variable LN (Not Exercised ratio), which is the natural logarithm of the number of unexercised options that the executive hold at the end of the year that were vested, divided by the aggregate number of stock options/stock appreciation rights granted. We expect a negative relationship between this ratio and the executive total compensation and the volume of stock options granted, but a positive relationship with short term cash compensation. If executives can not exercise their options, the company will probably have to give additional compensation, essentially in cash, to increase their motivation. We also expect that this relationship will be higher in NASDAQ listed firms because, as (Murphy (2003) To analyze the relationship between the firm risk and the executives" total compensation, option ratio and short term compensation, we also use the variable LN (BS VOLATILITY), which is the natural logarithm of the standard deviation volatility calculated over 60 months with Black and Scholes" methodology. We expect a positive relationship between the two dependent variables (total compensation and option ratio) with firm risk and a negative relationship with short term compensation. If the volatility is high, the firm"s stock price will also be high and companies will probably prefer to compensate their executives with more stock options. In this way, firms will probably reduce compensation based on cash compensation (short term compensation) and increase compensation based on stock options. We also expect that the relationship between stock return volatility and option ratio will be higher for NASDAQ listed firms because, as discussed above, executives from new technology firms are more compensated with stock options.
TRS1YR, one year total return to shareholders including the monthly reinvestment of dividends, is also used in our investigation to analyze the impact of shareholders" return on executive compensation. If shareholders receive a high return on their investments in the company, they don"t need to give more stock options to executives to align executives" interests with the owners" interest to reduce the agency cost. Based on this, we expect a negative relationship between option ratio, total compensation and the one year shareholders" return and a small positive relationship with cash compensation in the sense that companies will probably give some money to compensate executives" efforts, but they don"t need to give more stock options to motivate them.
We also test the effect of firm growth on executive compensation. The variable that we use to test this effect is the 5-year least squares annual growth rate of sales (SALE5LS). We expect, as Ryan and Wiggins (2001) , that executives would receive higher incentive pay in firms with higher growth opportunities.
In this investigation, we also control, like Barron and Waddel (2003) and Grinstein and Hribar (2004) , for the time effect on executive compensation in the sense that some of compensation changes can be associated merely to time effect. To control for time we create a dummy variable for each year between 1993 and 2004 assuming the value of 1 if the compensation is from the year and 0 if not. We believe that time will have strong effect to explain executive compensation in all the cases. In boom years we expect a higher compensation and in recessionary years we expect a lower compensation. Moreover, during technology boom years we expect an increase in compensation.
To control for industry effect on executive compensation, and based on Fama and French (1997) industry classifications we also create, for each industry, a dummy that assumes the value of 1 when the executive is associated with a specific industry sector and 0 when the executive is not associated with that specific sector. We also believe that some industries pay more to their executives then others therefore creatring industry specific effects.
A.2-Governance Variables
In the past few years we have witnessed a significant number of studies that have analyzed the relationship between board activity, board composition and executive compensation. Authors like Ryan Jr and Wiggins III (2004) find that CEO compensation is related to the power and influence that s/he has on the board, and firms with external directors on the board pay more compensation based on stock options and restricted stocks. Also, Anderson and Bizjak (2003) analyze whether board"s independence promotes shareholders´ interests and if the presence of the CEO on the Compensation Committee is related to opportunistic behaviour.
To analyze this relationship between board activity and executive compensation we use the variable LN (NUMMTGS), which is the natural logarithm of the number of board meetings held during the indicated fiscal year, and the dummy variable INTERLOCK, which assumes the value one when it is "true" that the executive serves on another board and zero if not.
We expect the number of board meetings to be negatively related to executive compensation because more control reduces the ability to increase compensation and it aligns the interests of shareholders and executives. Davidson Finally we use the dummy variables PDIRPENS, which assume the value equal to 1 when it is "TRUE" that the company pays to a director pension/retirement plan. We expect that if the company has a director pension plan, it may have the ability to pay less to its executives.
V. Empirical results
A. Summary statistics
In table 5 we describe the statistics of key financial and corporate governance variables that can help us to understand the differences between companies listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ. We can see that, NYSE firms are, on average, bigger than NASDAQ firms. The average number of executive stock options vested (but not exercised) and also the average numbers of executives interlocked are practically the same in both situations. NASDAQ listed firms generate a higher return to shareholders and the sale increases than NYSE firms. NYSE firms pay more to executive pension plans than NASDAQ listed firms.
B. Determinants of executive compensation for NYSE and NASDAQ listed firms
In this section we test the hypotheses that there are differences in forms and determinants of executive compensation for firms listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ. As we see from the table above, these two groups of companies have different characteristics; therefore, we believe that the factors that explain executive compensation in these two groups can also be different (Beck and Katz, 1995) . We also check whether correlation between independent variables is significant based on the Pearson correlation test and find that the correlation between the variables is small.
As a first step we investigate whether the listing place (exchange) and the job title of the executive influences the compensation. If listing exchange (Nadaq versus NYSE firms) and job title (CEOs versus directors) are significant variables then we will have an in-depth analysis of executive compensation for NYSE versus NASDAQ listed firms and also for CEO versus Directors. We run a fixed effect regression on each of the three dependent variables using all the explanatory variables stated above, including year and industry dummy variables, and on the top of that we add two dummy variables-"exchange" (1 if executive is from NASDAQ listed firm otherwise zero) and "status" (1 if the executive is Director otherwise zero). Regression results show that both variables are significant. Based on above finding, we proceed with our analysis and run separate fixed effect regressions on NYSE CEOs, Nasdaq CEOs, NYSE Directors, and Nasdaq Directors in order to identify the determinants of executive compensation. These regressions will show us whether the factors that explain the compensation of CEOs and Directors are the same for NYSE versus Nasdaq listed firms. Results are presented on tables 6 through 10. We further extended our analysis in tables 11 and 12 (shown in appendix) and perform the tests of equality of coefficients for regressions on Nasdaq CEO"s versus NYSE CEO"s and Nasdaq Directors versus NYSE Directors. That is we examine whether the factor intensity on executive compensation is same for Nasdaq versus NYSE sub-samples for CEOS and Directors. ) is the natural logarithm of the number of unexercised options that the executive held at year end that were vested, divided by the aggregate number of stock options/stock appreciation rights granted; LN (Bs Volatility) is the natural logarithm of standard deviation volatility calculated over 60 days with the Black Scholes method; LN (Nummtgs) is the natural logarithm of the number of board meetings held during the indicated fiscal year. LN (Tenure) is the natural logarithm of the number of years as CEO; TRS1TR is the one year total return to shareholders, including the monthly reinvestment of dividends; SALES5LS is the 5-year least squares annual growth rate of sales. Pdirpens is a dummy that assumes the value equal to 1 when it is true and zero when not. Pinterlock is a dummy that assumes the value of 1 when executive is at same time in two boards and 0 when not. Nasdaq is a dummy that assumes the value of 1 when executive is in a firm listed on NASDAQ and 0 when not. Pexecdir is a dummy that assumes the value of 1 when executive is directors and 0 when not. We also control for time effect in terms of executive compensation using a dummy for each year between 1993 and 2004 and for industry effect using the Fama and French (1997) 48 industry classifications. *Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 10%. is the natural logarithm of the number of years as CEO; TRS1TR is the one year total return to shareholders, including the monthly reinvestment of dividends; SALES5LS is the 5-year least squares annual growth rate of sales. Pdirpens is a dummy that assumes the value equal to 1 when it is true and zero when not. Pinterlock is a dummy that assumes the value of 1 when executive is at same time in two boards and 0 when not. We also control for time effect in terms of executive compensation using a dummy for each year between 1993 and 2004 and for industry effect using the Fama and French (1997) 48 industry classifications. is the natural logarithm of the number of years as CEO; TRS1TR is the one year total return to shareholders, including the monthly reinvestment of dividends; SALES5LS is the 5-year least squares annual growth rate of sales. Pdirpens is a dummy that assumes the value equal to 1 when it is true and zero when not. Pinterlock is a dummy that assumes the value of 1 when executive is at same time in two boards and 0 when not. We also control for time effect in terms of executive compensation using a dummy for each year between 1993 and 2004 and for industry effect using the Fama and French (1997) 48 industry classifications. TRS1TR is the one year total return to shareholders, including the monthly reinvestment of dividends; SALES5LS is the 5-year least squares annual growth rate of sales. Pdirpens is a dummy that assumes the value equal to 1 when it is true and zero when not. Pinterlock is a dummy that assumes the value of 1 when executive is at same time in two boards and 0 when not. We also control for time effect in terms of executive compensation using a dummy for each year between 1993 and 2004 and for industry effect using the Fama and French (1997) *Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 10% is the one year total return to shareholders, including the monthly reinvestment of dividends; SALES5LS is the 5-year least squares annual growth rate of sales. Pdirpens is a dummy that assumes the value equal to 1 when it is true and zero when not. Pinterlock is a dummy that assumes the value of 1 when executive is at same time in two boards and 0 when not. We also control for time effect in terms of executive compensation using a dummy for each year between 1993 and 2004 and for industry effect using the Fama and French (1997) 48 industry classifications. *Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level ,*** significant at 10% 
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CAnalysis of the results
As we expected, the above results show that executive compensation for NYSE versus NASDAQ listed firms is explained by different factors. We also analyze in tables 11 and 12 if the factor intensity (coefficients of the regressions of the CEOs and Directors of NYSE and NASDAQ listed firms) is same. We find that in all the cases the values of the coefficients are significantly different. Prior research has shown that the firm size is one of the most important variables in explaining executive compensation. From tables 7 and 8, we can see that the size variable is significant in explaining variation in executive total compensation; however, it has a stronger impact in case of NASDAQ listed firms than the NYSE listed firms. Firm size has a positive influence on option ratio for CEOs in the case of NASDAQ listed firms, meaning that size influences the number of stock options granted to NASDAQ executives. This relationship is not statistically significant for the NYSE. The firm"s size also influences positively the CEO"s short term executive compensation (salary and bonus).
In the case of Directors, all three executive compensation dependent variables are positively related to the size of the firm but the directors" compensation for NASDAQ listed firms is more sensitive to firm size than for the NYSE listed firms.
Not exercised ratio, which represents the number of options not exercised but vested, is negatively related to CEOs´ total compensation and option ratio both for NYSE and NASDAQ listed firms and, as we expected, it is positively related to short term CEO compensation in both cases, meaning that when executives have stock options they can not exercise, the firms give them additional compensation, in cash, to increase executive motivation. In the case of Directors, we also find a negative relationship between total compensation and option ratio and a positive relationship between short term compensation and option ratio, but this relationship is only significant, in last case, in NASDAQ listed firms, meaning that Directors from these firms can not exercise the stock options that they have and; therefore, firms give more cash compensation to increase their motivation.
The stock return volatility influences total compensation positively with the exception of CEOs from NASDAQ where the relationship is not statistically significant. The option ratio has also a positive and significant relationship with firm stock return volatility. The results are congruent with Yermack (1995) and Bryan and Hwang"s ( 2000) findings. We also find a negative relationship between cash compensation and stock return volatility like Core, Holthausen and larker (1999). In the case of Directors, we find a positive relationship between total compensation, option ratio and firm stock return volatility and a negative relationship with short term compensation in both cases, meaning that when volatility increases, firms prefer to give more stock options to the executive and less cash compensation. These relationships are stronger in the case of NASDAQ than for the NYSE. Noguera and Highfiled (2007) are of the view that the board of directors is the central internal mechanism of corporate governance in place at any corporation. Some authors include the size of the board, others the composition of the boards or the influence of the CEO on the board as an explanatory variable of executive compensation. Davidson III, Pilger and Szakmary (1998) use the number of board meetings and find that it is negatively related to executive compensation because more control reduces the ability to increase compensation and thus align the interests of shareholders and executives. Also, Ryan and Wiggins (2001) conclude that more monitoring power can reduce the need to provide CEOs with more incentive compensation. Our results are congruent with previous findings in the case of NYSE CEO short term compensation and NYSE and NASDAQ Directors in the case of option ratio and short term compensation.
We also find that tenure strongly affects, in positive terms, CEO compensation for NYSE listed firms but only slightly affects NASDAQ firms. Only in the case of NASDAQ listed firms do we find that the option ratio is positively and significantly related to CEO tenure. Our results are not consistent with the results of Ryan and Wiggins (2001); Conyon and He (2004) , who find that CEO entrenchment due to tenure would lead to higher cash compensation and lower incentive compensation (stock options). We only find consistent results in the case of Directors tenure in which case there is a strong positive relationship between tenure and total and short term compensation for NYSE listed firms. In the case of NASDAQ listed firms, option ratio is positively related to tenure but the results are not congruent with the previous findings that executives will prefer a more certain compensation (cash compensation) over less uncertain compensation (stock options).
The one year return to shareholders negatively affects CEO option ratio for NYSE listed firms, and positively affects the cash compensation that these CEOs receive. In the case of NASDAQ listed firms, the relationships are not statistically significant. As we expected, if shareholders are satisfied with the return of their investments, they don"t need to give their executives more incentives based on stock options. We don"t find a negative relationship between cash compensation and one year shareholders" return, meaning that NYSE companies compensate their CEOs with more cash compensation when they receive higher returns of investments. In the case of Directors, we find a positive relationship with total compensation and short term compensation for NYSE listed firms and a negative relationship with option ratio. In the case of NASDAQ listed firms, this relationship is only positive and statistically significant with cash compensation.
The sales increase in the last five years has a positive and statistically significant relationship but only with the CEO total compensation and option ratio for NYSE listed firms. The results are consistent with the findings of Ryan and Wiggins (2001) and Anderson et al., (2000) , which show that executives receive higher incentive pay in firms with higher growth opportunities. These results though are inconsistent with the findings of Ghosh and Sirmans (2005) that find a negative relationship between executive total compensation and firm growth opportunities. In the case of NASDAQ listed firms, the relationship is not statistically significant. In the case of NYSE Directors, the sales increase in the last 5 years influences, in positive terms, all the dependent variables. NASDAQ director compensation is not affected by the sales increase in the last five years.
As we expected, the existence of firm pension plans influences, in negative terms, total compensation, option ratio and short term compensation, but only in the case of NYSE listed firms, meaning that if the firm has already put money in executives" pension plans, they are able to justify a reduction in executive compensation during the year. In the case of Directors, only the total and short term compensation in NYSE listed firms are affected by the existence of Directors" pension plans in the company.
As we also expected, interlocked executives will receive more total compensation and stock options, but the results are only statistically significant for NYSE listed firms. The results are congruent with Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) and Hallock (1997) , who find that interlocked executives can positively influence their personal compensation. In the case of Directors, we find a positive relationship with total compensation and option compensation for NYSE listed firms and a positive relationship with short term compensation for NASDAQ listed firms.
We also achieve interesting results in terms of the effect of the years on CEO and directors compensation. The year effect strongly explains the total executive compensation in NYSE listed firms for CEOs and directors but not for NASDAQ listed firms. Only after 1999 do we find a positive and statistically significant relationship in NASDAQ listed firms, but in smaller terms than NYSE listed firms. When we analyze the option ratio, we find that both groups of CEOs are always influenced by the effect of time, but the relationship is stronger for NYSE listed firms. In terms of short term compensation, this relationship is only positive and statistically significant for NYSE listed firms. In the case of Directors, the time effect strongly influences total compensation, option ratio and short term compensation for NYSE listed firms but the time effect has less significance for NASDAQ listed firms.
Finally, we also analyze the industry effect, using the 48 Fama and French (1997) industry classification and find that some of these dummies can also explain executive compensation. This is the case of Business, which has a negative relationship with CEO total compensation, and computer and construction, which have a positive relationship with total compensation. The computer industry also has a positive relationship with the NYSE CEO Option ratio. We also find a negative and statistically significant relationship with short term compensation and the apparel, candy and computer industry and a positive relationship in the medical industry.
In the case of Directors, we find a negative relationship with the business industry and total compensation for NYSE listed firms and a positive relationship between total compensation and the consumer and manufacturing industry, also for NYSE listed firms. In the case of option ratio, we find a positive relationship with the manufacturing industry also for NYSE and a negative relationship with the Business industry and cash compensation for NYSE. We also find a positive relationship between cash compensation and the computer, construction, consumer, manufacturing and trading industry for NYSE listed firms.
V. Conclusion
This is the first paper that analyzes whether executive compensation for the NYSE and NASDAQ4 listed firms is explained by the same factors. Using a oneway fixed effect regression in an unbalanced panel sample for the period of 1992 to 2004 we also investigate the trends in terms of executive compensation in NYSE and NASDAQ listed firms, the forms of the compensation and whether the forms and weights of compensation changed after the NASDAQ crash in 2000 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.
Our results reveal that executive compensation is influenced by different factors for NYSE and NASDAQ listed firm, and when some of the factors are the same, the intensity of the coefficients are different, and this difference is statistically significant.
